WESTERN-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 1960-1990

UDC: 339.9 (47+57) “1960”

WESTERN-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 1960-1990

AND THE GROWING SOVIET DEBT TO THE WEST

PART 1: THE 1960S

Gabriela Gavrilov

Emerson College, Boston, Massachusetts (1996)

MA Journalism

Catholic University, Washington, D.C. (1985) +

University of Warsaw, Poland (1983 – 1984)

BA Political Science / Economics

ggavrilov100@yahoo.com

http://orcid.org/0009-0008-9246-9646

Abstract. This article examines Western–Soviet commercial relations in the 1960s, focusing on government-backed export credits, technology transfers, and the early accumulation of Soviet external debt. Drawing primarily on declassified CIA economic intelligence reports, it demonstrates how large-scale imports of Western industrial plants and equipment transformed Soviet trade practices from cash and barter to systemic credit dependence. The article forms the first part of a three-part series analyzing the financial mechanisms that ultimately undermined the Soviet economic system.

Keywords. Soviet debt; Cold War economics; export credits; technology transfer; CIA economic intelligence; Western-Soviet trade; industrial imports; dual-use technology.

There is no such thing as free cheese —

it exists only in a mousetrap.

Russian proverb

Introduction

This is a new cycle of articles of the author, Gabriela Gavrilov, on the Soviet debt to the West countries during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, which will eventually explain the financial reasons behind the Soviet Union’s fall. The current article is devoted to Western-Soviet commercial relations in 1960s.

The Cold War was an intense, decades-long (1947–1991) nuclear and conventional weapons competition between the US and USSR. Publicly driven by ideologies and the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), both sides built massive arsenals to deter attack from the other, resulting in severe economic strain, bloody proxy wars, and global fear of nuclear annihilation. A significant beneficiary of this prolonged confrontation was the industrial sector, particularly firms engaged in supplying technology, equipment, and know-how to both blocs. In the interest of brevity, this article will be limited to the 1960s.^[1]

To establish the context of the long-standing hostility between the Western countries, especially the United States, and the Soviet Union and Bloc countries, the 1960s were characterized by continued intense political and ideological polarization between the US and its allies and Soviet Russia and its allies. Globally publicized events included:

• The Vietnam War (1955–1975) involved North Vietnam, which was supported by the Soviet Union and China, and South Vietnam, supported by the US and other anti-communist nations.
• In May 1960, the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory. In the wake of the event, a planned summit was cancelled which heightened already strained Cold War tensions.
• In 1961, following tense meetings between Kennedy and Khrushchev, East Germany—with Soviet backing—constructed the Berlin Wall, creating a physical barrier between East and West.
• Between 1961 and 1963, the US deployed 15 Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Turkey.^[2] This led the USSR to begin shipping medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SS-4 and SS-5) to Cuba in May 1962. Construction of these missile sites was publicly announced by US intelligence in October 1962, leading to a 13-day standoff in which the US portrayed the Soviet move as unilateral, not discussing the US missiles along the Soviet border in Turkey. US citizens were encouraged to believe that the USSR was about to launch nuclear weapons against the US mainland.
• The Space Race: US media reports of Soviet testing of space vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) encouraged a media campaign encouraging US citizens to fund an increasingly expensive US Space Program, instead of education, health and cultural programs.
• Arms Race Escalation: The Cuban Missile crisis led both the Soviet and US governments to pursue a massive buildup of conventional and strategic nuclear forces against each other. The arms race and space race drove heavy investment in R&D, including aerospace, electronics, and early, sophisticated weapon systems.
• Throughout the 1960s, the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) became firmly established as both sides possessed the capability to destroy the earth’s surface and atmosphere, forcing a dangerous, yet cautious, co-existence.
• U.S. defense spending in the 1960s surged primarily to fund the Vietnam War and maintain military superiority during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Key drivers included countering perceived missile gaps, investing in aerospace technology (space race), and strengthening conventional forces to manage global crises, such as the Berlin standoff. Based on historical data for US military spending between 1960 and 1969, the total defense budget for this 10-year period was approximately $647.7 billion in current-year dollars. ^[3],[4]

US Annual Military Spending (1960–1969) (US $ Billions)

1960: $47.35

1961: $49.88

1962: $54.65

1963: $54.56

1964: $53.43

1965: $54.56

1966: $66.44

1967: $78.40

1968: $84.33

1969: $84.99

Total (1960-1969): $647.74 billion^[5]

Nevertheless, according to now declassified CIA reports from that era:

During the 1960s, the Soviet Union was increasingly offered government-backed credits by West European nations and Japan to finance its purchase of technology, licenses and know-how from Western firms. Coordinated by Western governments, these credits (derived from taxpayer funds) were often provided at below-market interest rates^[6] and were used to pay for an increasing array of electronics & communications, ships & marine equipment, mining, metallurgical, chemical, oil, gas & pipeline equipment, motor vehicle manufacturing plants and equipment and other dual-use technology (dual-use industrial technology) critical to maintain and enhance modern military prowess. The acceptance of Western credits, however, increase Soviet debt burden to Western financial institutions and eventually lead to the Fall of Communism (as will be covered in an upcoming article “Western-Soviet Commercial Relations 1980-1991”.)

During the first four decades of the Soviet Union’s existence, the USSR conducted virtually all its commercial transactions with the West on a cash basis^[7] or barter. The upsurge in imports of Western plants and equipment during the 1960s, however, not only made it unfeasible for the Soviet Union to supply buy-back products to all of the Western companies whose equipment or plant it purchased—such as the some 234 chemical plants, equipment and technology contracts won by elite Western firms for delivery to the Soviet Union between 1957 and mid-1963 alone^[8]–but quickly increased its indebtedness to the West, which reached US$1 billion^[9] by 1969. To maintain access to the Soviet market, Western governments quickly stepped in to provide taxpayer funds to the Soviet Union, in the form of government-backed credits, to keep their elite firms sustained with sufficient market industrial share and lucrative contracts.

1. Major 1960s Credit Agreements and Trade Deals

Italy

The agreement to build the FIAT plant in Toliatti, USSR, was signed on May 4, 1966, in Turin, Italy, by FIAT CEO Vittorio Valletta and the Soviet Minister of Automobile Industry. The contract established the construction of the VAZ plant (Volga Automobile Works) to produce popular, affordable cars, with construction beginning shortly after in early 1967.

In 1967, the Italian government provided a loan of up to $300 million with liberal ten-year credits at 6% interest, v. the (then) current 8% commercial rate to cover Soviet purchases of equipment and technology for the construction of the massive FIAT automobile plant at Toliattigrad (VAZ), built between 1966 and 1970 in collaboration with Fiat. As the largest car plant in Russia, it produced over 16 million vehicles, significantly contributing to the motorization of the Soviet Union. The total project value was estimated at between $650 million and $887 million. In January 1968, Pirelli concluded a $50 million deal to make rubber parts for the Fiats.^[10]

The US Export-Import Bank also supplied a $50 million loan to Italy, to finance US machine tools that were to be used in the Italian-built Soviet plant. An October 1966 article in Forbes, stated that, “Three quarters of the machinery that FIAT installs for the Russians will come from the United States, either directly or indirectly through European subsidiaries and licensees of American firms. It will really be the United States that puts the Russians on wheels.”^[11]

Japan

In 1968, the Japanese government financed a five-year $133 million credit loan at 5.8% to the Soviet government to purchase Japanese firms’ equipment for the development of Siberian timberlands, taking repayment in timber deliveries under the Japanese-Soviet Timber Agreements of that year.^[12] According to a 1968 article in TIME Magazine, “In addition, a consortium of 13 Japanese companies, including such big trading firms as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, will be allowed to sell $30 million worth of consumer goods to Russian settlers in Siberia. As repayment of the loan and to cover its interest, the Russians over a five-year period will ship 8,020,000 cubic feet of timber to Japan.”^[13]

France and the UK

According to a Confidential CIA report (declassified and released in 2011):

In May 1965 the French Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique (CEA) and the Soviet State Committee for the Application of Atomic Energy signed an agreement for cooperation in nuclear energy. A practical result of these negotiations was the French undertaking to install a bubble chamber at Serpukhov—the Soviet high energy research institute—in return for the right to have some 50 French scientists work with the large particle accelerator there. This stationing of a large group of Western scientists is the USSR for an extended period of time constituted unique precedent. Under this arrangement, however, the Soviets obtained—at practically no cost sophisticated research device worth approximately $10 million.

While the venture was hardly a “unique precedent”, except in the eyes of the public, the return on that $10 million investment would be in Western government contracts to ‘keep up with Soviet military advances made in the field of nuclear fusion’.

In 1969, the French government signed a major trade and economic cooperation agreement, the French-Soviet Cooperation Agreements, promising the “easiest credit terms” and aiming to double trade over a five-year period. This Scientific & Technical Cooperation (STC) built on 1966 agreements which included joint projects in color television (SECAM), nuclear energy, and space exploration.^[14]

A Five-Year Trade Agreement signed on May 24, 1959, and enacted in 1960, became the primary framework for UK-Soviet trade during the 1960s, for both consumer goods and industrial machinery.^[15] Throughout the late 1960s, both the UK and France extended large credit lines to the Soviet Union for purchasing chemical plants, textile machinery, and other industrial technology. These Western European nations allowed “swing credits”—overdraft facilities that permitted the Soviets to temporarily finance trade deficits.^[16]

Germany

During the 1960s, West Germany and the Soviet Union maintained significant, expanding trade despite lacking formal, comprehensive trade agreements after 1963. The vastness of Russia’s energy reserves became apparent in the 1960s. While the U.S. pressured West Germany to veto oil-for-pipe contracts in 1962, this energy project set the stage for later, massive, long-term cooperation that cemented the Soviet-German economic relationship. Key trade revolved around importing Soviet oil and raw materials in exchange for Western technology, culminating in pivotal “pipe-for-oil” deals that established durable, long-term energy infrastructure.

Between 1959 and 1962, West Germany firms such as Mannesmann and Thyssen sold approximately 600,000 tons of large-diameter pipes to the Soviet Union. Under US pressure, NATO established an embargo between 1962 and 1966 intended to stop these shipments, however, some orders (e.g., 163,000 tons in 1963) were already in process and continued and West German firms remained key suppliers of specialized, large-diameter steel pipe crucial for the construction of Soviet pipelines such as the Druzhba pipeline.

The NATO embargo notwithstanding, during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1959–1965) (actually seven-year plan), West Germany and Sweden together supplied at least 40% of the Soviet Union’s total requirements for large-diameter pipes. Following the lifting of the embargo in 1966, Germany continued to be a primary source for Soviet energy infrastructure, cementing the “pipes for gas” relationship.

Sweden

Under a 1947 agreement, the Swedish government had given the Soviet government one billion in Swedish Kroner credit over a 5-year period to purchase Swedish products. In 1968, the first connection between the Eastern and Western natural gas systems was built, between Austria and Czechoslovakia (Bratstvo pipeline).

During the 1960s, the USSR made significant and ongoing purchases from Sweden, largely focused on industrial modernization, raw material processing, and energy infrastructure. These imports were facilitated by trade agreements that encouraged the exchange of Soviet raw materials (like oil) for Swedish manufactured goods.

The Soviet Union placed substantial orders for Swedish machinery to support industrial development. This included specialized equipment for mining, forestry, and, importantly, the forestry-related pulp and paper industry. Sweden supplied the Soviet Union with industrial steel, including wide steel pipes, which were crucial for developing the Soviet natural gas pipeline network. Sweden also sold the Soviet Union specialized vessels, including trawlers and cargo ships.^[17]

The USSR imported equipment for hydropower and thermal power stations from Sweden, as well as chemical products, ball bearings, and high-precision optical equipment. These purchases were often part of a broader, long-term trade arrangement where Sweden, a strong industrial nation, acted as a key supplier of advanced technology and machinery to the USSR during the Cold War.

United States

Between 1957 and mid-1963 alone, US and West European firms sold over $1.3 billion worth of chemical plants and related equipment to the Soviet Union in “known values from ‘selected contracts’” listed in a secret CIA Economic Intelligence Report of April 1964. This would be equivalent to about $14.3 billion in todays’ values.

In 1963–1964, the Soviet Union purchased over $100 million of US wheat, with licenses approved for up to $390 million in grain and related agricultural products during that period. While smaller, sporadic purchases continued, large-scale, consistent, and “massive” US grain buying by the Soviet Union did not become a regular feature of international trade until 1972.^[18]

Known Value of Western Firms’ Sales to the Soviet Union

Following is a verbatim chart taken from a declassified Secret CIA Intelligence memorandum, Soviet Indebtedness to the West (ER IM 70-163), November 1970 (released as sanitized March 10, 2010):

Had Finnish-Soviet trade been included the figures would have quadrupled or more. Finland, through Scientific Technical Cooperation (STC) agreements (covered in my previous article)^[19] became a primary trade partner with the Soviet Union, funneling technology, electronics and cables (especially Nokia) as well as ships to the USSR under a post war reparations agreement.

The following tables are reproduced verbatim from declassified CIA economic intelligence memoranda. While many sections remain redacted, even the sanitized versions clearly illustrate the scale, sectoral diversity, and military relevance of Western technology transfers to the USSR.

May 1967 CIA Report on 1967 Sales of Western Plants and Equipment to the Soviet Union (5 Months) NOT INCLUDING FINLAND (2 full Pages Censored before being Released in 1999)
	Industry	Company* & Creditor(s)	Selling Country	Value (US Millions)	Remarks	ADDITION TO THE CIA CHART Military Application
A.	Chemical & Petrochemical
	2″ SPACE BLANKED OUT
B.	Oil Refinery & Pipeline Equipment
	40,000 tons of steel pipe, diameter 1,020mm	Undisclosed	Sweden	Undisclosed	“Will sell in 1967.”
C.	Metalworking & Metallurgy
	High Carbon, High Speed Machine Drills, Metal Cutting Bits, and Various Machine Tools	Undisclosed	Sweden	Undisclosed		High-carbon, high-speed steel (HSS) metal cutting bits are used by the military for machining durable materials in manufacturing, maintenance, and repair. Their toughness, wear resistance, and ability to withstand high temperatures make them ideal for the demands of military applications, particularly in the aerospace and defense sectors.
	.5 ” SPACE BLANKED OUT
D.	Food Processing
	Grape Juice Factory	Undisclosed	France	$0.8	Production September 1968.	N/A
	Milk Packaging Equipment	Undisclosed	Sweden	$1.0		N/A
E.	Paper & Pulp Industry
	NONE
F.	Textile Manufacturing
	Textile Plant to Produce Cold Weather Fabrics	Undisclosed	France	Undisclosed	7-Year Credit from date of delivery.
	Shirt plant, 8 million/year	Undisclosed	Italy	$1.5		N/A
H.	Electronics
	Color TV Pilot Plant – 6,000 picture tubes a year
	Ancillary Equipment for Olivetti Computer to Rationalize Flow of Agricultural Spare Parts	Undisclosed	France	$4.50
	2 Olivetti Data Processor Model GE 115	Undisclosed	Italy	$0.3		The 1966 Olivetti Programma 101 computer had significant military applications for the U.S. armed forces, particularly during the Vietnam War. While it was not a hardened military computer, for its portability and programming capabilities made it useful for specific, on-site calculations.  The U.S. Air Force utilized the Programma 101 for critical targeting calculations for B-52 Stratofortress bombers. It was used as part of a larger system to compute coordinates for ground-directed bombing. This enabled the air force to rapidly perform complex arithmetic needed for accurate bombing missions. In addition to direct military use, the P101 was purchased by NASA for the Apollo 11 moon landing program. In this capacity, it was used by a military-civilian entity for applications that were highly relevant to national defense and the Cold War’s space race. NASA used the machines for a variety of critical tasks, including Mapping lunar trajectories, Calculating coordinates for the lunar landing, Determining flight path corrections for the mission.
	1 Electronic Data Processor Model G 425	Undisclosed	Italy	$0.6		Olivetti Data Processor Model GE 115 was a second-generation, commercial business computer originally released in the mid-1960s to handle tasks like payroll, accounting, and inventory. The Olivetti GE 115 was designed for businesses and competed with other commercial mainframes of the era, not military-grade hardware.
	2 SDS 910 (US) Computers	Undisclosed	Italy	$0.8		While no evidence exists for a military computer called the “Electronic Data Processor Model G 425,” the search results indicate that the military did use the Bendix G-15, a contemporary computer with similar alphanumeric designations. A military version of the G-15 could have been used for calculating and plotting missile trajectories. The Bendix G-15 featured a combination digital computer and digital differential analyzer (DDA), allowing it to process both general-purpose calculations and specialized differential equations. This would have been useful for calculating complex flight paths.
I.	Automotive	Undisclosed	United States	$0.6		The SDS 910 was used in missile checkout and seismic data reduction, among other military-related applications. As a member of the Scientific Data Systems (SDS) 900 series of computers in the 1960s, its uses were part of broader applications in fields like defense technology and scientific analysis.
	Equipment and Technology for Modernizing the Moskovich Plant
J.	Ships & Marine Equipment	Undisclosed	France	$50.0	8.5 Year Credit; Agreement in Principal Only	Originally built by Ford Motor Company (US) in 1929.
	4 – 2,600 ton Fully Automated Fish Processing and Refrigeration Vessels
K.	Other	Undisclosed	Netherlands	Undisclosed		N/A
	Plant for the Double Distillation of Water to be used in Blood Plasma Plant
	Printing Equipment, two-8 Color Rotary Printing Presses, Photo engraving equipment, Newspaper Conveyor Belts and Electronic Meters	Undisclosed	Austria	Undisclosed		N/A
	3 Installations for Production of Aerosol Containers	Undisclosed	France	$2.0		Helps Disseminate Soviet Propaganda
		Undisclosed	Italy	$5.5	Delivery early 1968.	Military uses for aerosol containers range from battlefield applications like non-lethal crowd control and tactical screening to essential support functions such as large-scale pest control, equipment maintenance, and fire suppression.
	Electrolytic Condenser	Undisclosed	Italy	$0.8		Electrolytic condensers in military applications serve crucial roles in power supplies, filtering, energy storage, and signal coupling for aircraft, ground vehicles, and radar systems. They are designed to meet specific requirements, such as high-temperature operation, resistance to vibration and shock, high capacitance retention at low temperatures, and hermetic sealing to prevent electrolyte dry-out, replacing less reliable components like wet tantalum capacitors.
	8″ SPACE BLANKED OUT through 2 FULL PAGES
			5 Month TOTAL	$68.4

1. Growing Soviet Debt

According to a November 1970 CIA Memorandum, Soviet indebtedness to the West, accrued from medium- and long-term credits, had grown rapidly during the late 1960s, from about $50 million to $380 million in the seven years 1959-1965, and then rose to almost $1.2 billion in the four years 1966-1969. Between 1959 and 1965, trade with the West as a whole grew at the annual rate of nearly 11%, exceeding $5 billion in 1965. Following crop failures in 1963 and 1965, the Soviet Union began using Western credit to buy grain from Canada and the US. Between 1965 and 1969, Soviet long-term debt to the West rose by some $800 million, growing to roughly $1.6 billion by the end of 1970^[20] (equivalent to approximately $13.37 billion in 2026).

As the hard currency trade deficit increased to an average of $350 million a year, the Soviet Union resorted to gold sales, averaging more than $500 million in annual gold sales between 1963 and 1965. Soviet gold reserves fell by more than $1 billion during 1963-1965 reaching a low of about $1 billion by the end of 1965.^[21]

This created a self-reinforcing cycle: credit-financed imports expanded industrial capacity but failed to generate sufficient hard-currency exports, forcing increased reliance on gold sales and further borrowing.

Nevertheless, machinery and equipment imports, especially pipeline equipment, from the developed West surpassed their earlier high level in 1966 and increased to a new high of $670 million in 1967.^[22]

The growing debt and depletion of gold reserves did not stop Soviet government from continuing and even greatly increasing its imports of industrial plants and equipment from Western firms as will be discussed in the following article focusing on the 1970s.

TO BE CONTINUED

References:

Electronic resource: World Military Expenditures 1969, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/185679.pdf

Electronic resource: https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~dludden/USmilitarybudget02a.htm#:~:text=Subsequent%20Buildups%20and%20Retrenchments,but%20the%20decline%20during%20the

Electronic resource: https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/HIC/high-income/military-spending-defense-budget#:~:text=Table_title:%20Military%20Spending/Defense%20Budget%201960%2D2024%20Table_content:%20header:,%7C%20:%20$69.80B%20%7C%20:%206.63%25%20%7C

Secret CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (Nov. 1970). Soviet Indebtedness to the West. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release, March 10, 2010.

Secret CIA Economic Intelligence Report, (April 1964). “Selected Soviet Contracts for Chemical Equipment and Technology”. CIA/RR ER 64-9, Released as Sanitized 1998.

No Author (February 23, 1968). Trade: Italy to Russia, TIME.

No Author (Oct. 1, 1966). To Russia—Without Love, Forbes, pp. 19-20.

Sumiye O. McGuire (May 1990). Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations, RAND, Santa Monica, The Rand Corp.

Electronic resource: No Author (Sept. 13, 1968). Japan: Eyes on Siberia, TIME. https://time.com/archive/6632800/japan-eyes-on-siberia/

Electronic resource: Confidential CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (January 1972). Soviet-French Economic Cooperation, ER-IM 72-10. Sanitized approved for Release, Jan. 18, 2011. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030010-6.pdf

Electronic resource: For the Text of the Treaty (in English): https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1960-TS0034.pdf

Electronic resource: Confidential CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (January 1972). Soviet-French Economic Cooperation, ER-IM 72-10. Sanitized approved for Release, Jan. 18, 2011.

Electronic resource: Riitta Hjerppe (No Date). Economic History of Sweden, Economic History Assoc., University of Helsinki, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-finland/#:~:text=Exports%20and%2C%20accordingly%2C%20the%20structure,the%20government%20in%20the%201950s

Electronic resource: Confidential CIA Memorandum, (Aug. 28, 1964), US Sales of Wheat to the Soviet Union as Related to the US Taxpayer, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000969853.pdf

Gabriela Gavrilov. Russian Emerging Economy and American Oligarchs. Scientific Platform XXI Century, # 9 (December 2025), pp.21-43, www.episs.ru

Secret CIA Intelligence Memorandum (November 1970), Soviet Indebtedness to the West, ER IM 70-163, Declassified, Sanitized released March 10, 2012.

1. Note: While this article demonstrates that nearly all Soviet technology was imported from the West during the period discussed, in no way is it meant to insinuate that Soviet Russia was incapable of producing technology—in fact, quite the opposite. As recounted my recent book, US-Russian Commercial Relations 1763-1933 (2025, Atlantic), because of Russia’s emerging economy at the turn of the previous century, its unparallelled natural resources and the unique geo-commercial location of Eurasia, the yoke of communism was utilized to annihilate domestic entrepreneurship, reorganize the Russian economy into government controlled trusts and syndicates and then turn those monopolies over to Western firms who sat on the boards of the industrial trusts. Soviet Russia, under the yoke of communism, served as a captive industrial market for Western firms. The following continues to confirm that conclusion. ↑
2. As of 2026, the US maintains approximately 50 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey while Russia has none anywhere near the US—unless you consider the entire globe US territory. ↑
3. World Military Expenditures 1969, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/185679.pdf ↑
4. https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~dludden/USmilitarybudget02a.htm#:~:text=Subsequent%20Buildups%20and%20Retrenchments,but%20the%20decline%20during%20the ↑
5. https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/HIC/high-income/military-spending-defense-budget#:~:text=Table_title:%20Military%20Spending/Defense%20Budget%201960%2D2024%20Table_content:%20header:,%7C%20:%20$69.80B%20%7C%20:%206.63%25%20%7C ↑
6. Secret CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (Nov. 1970). Soviet Indebtedness to the West. Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release, March 10, 2010. ↑
7. Ibid. ↑
8. Secret CIA Economic Intelligence Report, (April 1964). “Selected Soviet Contracts for Chemical Equipment and Technology”. CIA/RR ER 64-9, Released as Sanitized 1998. ↑
9. Approximately $8.84 billion in 2026 dollars. ↑
10. No Author (February 23, 1968). Trade: Italy to Russia, TIME. ↑
11. No Author (Oct. 1, 1966). To Russia—Without Love, Forbes, pp. 19-20. ↑
12. Sumiye O. McGuire (May 1990). Soviet-Japanese Economic Relations, RAND, Santa Monica, The Rand Corp. ↑
13. No Author (Sept. 13, 1968). Japan: Eyes on Siberia, TIME. https://time.com/archive/6632800/japan-eyes-on-siberia/ ↑
14. Confidential CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (January 1972). Soviet-French Economic Cooperation, ER-IM 72-10. Sanitized approved for Release, Jan. 18, 2011. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00875R001700030010-6.pdf ↑
15. For the Text of the Treaty (in English): https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1960-TS0034.pdf ↑
16. Confidential CIA Intelligence Memorandum, (January 1972). Soviet-French Economic Cooperation, ER-IM 72-10. Sanitized approved for Release, Jan. 18, 2011. ↑
17. Riitta Hjerppe (No Date). Economic History of Sweden, Economic History Assoc., University of Helsinki, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-finland/#:~:text=Exports%20and%2C%20accordingly%2C%20the%20structure,the%20government%20in%20the%201950s ↑
18. Confidential CIA Memorandum, (Aug. 28, 1964), US Sales of Wheat to the Soviet Union as Related to the US Taxpayer, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000969853.pdf ↑
19. Gabriela Gavrilov. Russian Emerging Economy and American Oligarchs. Scientific Platform XXI Century, # 9 (December 2025), pp.21-43, www.episs.ru

    ↑

20. Secret CIA Intelligence Memorandum (November 1970), Soviet Indebtedness to the West, ER IM 70-163, Declassified, Sanitized released March 10, 2012. ↑
21. Ibid. ↑
22. Ibid. ↑